


25X1

*for June 75
brief trip*



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June 10, 1975

STRATEGIC FORCES

I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet strategic weapons programs.

A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems indicated. We believe that [REDACTED] ICBM launchers are currently operational. Since the signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have not increased the number of ICBM launchers.

25X1

1. Of the deployed launchers, [REDACTED] are for the SS-9. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] The largest number of silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11 and SS-13 systems, [REDACTED]

25X1

2. The number of operational launchers at any one time will fluctuate as the Soviets continue their silo modification programs for new missiles.

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ADD

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
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
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VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.

A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch silos [REDACTED]

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- 6 -

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TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

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1. There are currently [REDACTED] launchers for
for these missiles operational in the
western USSR, for use primarily against
targets in western Europe.

25X1

2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
[REDACTED] MRBM and IRBM launchers located
along the periphery of the USSR. In late
1967, however, they began deactivating
some of the launch sites. [REDACTED]

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B. [REDACTED]

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
June 10, 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

25X1



B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery

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25X1

June 10, 1975

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

I. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.

A. The Soviets have a force of [] heavy bombers [] tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary mission is intercontinental operations. They also have [] medium bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.

25X1

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1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight conditions. It is best suited for operations against targets in Europe and Asia.

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
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4. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline. The Backfire probably will not replace the older bombers on a one-for-one basis.

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25X1

June 10, 1975

THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

- I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.
 - A. The most visible military presence is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.
 1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets also have a continuing interest in improving their capabilities against ballistic missile firing submarines.
 2. To accomplish these goals the Soviets maintain an average--including surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries--

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


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II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.

A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.

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
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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier--
expected to be fully operational in
late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean. This



25X1

[REDACTED] will probably
carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-
copters.

25X1

(1) These drawings show the size of
the Soviet carrier in relation to
US carriers.

-III. As you are aware, the Soviets have begun taking
advantage of recent amendments to Yugoslavian law
that opens naval repair facilities to foreign ships.
A. To date only a diesel submarine and a submarine
tender have been noted at the port of Tivat but
we expect the Soviets will continue using these
facilities as allowed under the new provisions.

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June 10, 1975

OKEAN '75 NAVAL EXERCISE

I. In April, the Soviets conducted a large-scale naval exercise named Okean '75. [REDACTED]

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B. Over 200 surface warships, submarines, and support vessels took part in Okean '75 operations. Most of the exercise activity occurred in the Atlantic and Pacific but the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean were also involved.

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II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the

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Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

A. There are about 37 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.

1. The five divisions from the Siberian Military District that could be used as immediate reinforcements bring the total to about 42.

B. For air support, they could call on some 1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area.

C. The ground and tactical air forces in the border area now number about 365,000 men.

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25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties, the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their efforts to developing support units at the army and front level.

[REDACTED]

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F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

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1. As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.

III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the rapid build-up following the border clashes in 1969.

A. The force in these four northern military regions numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.

1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a clear military superiority and a commitment to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply

line which parallels the China border.

2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than

- 5 -

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25X1

4,000 in the border regions against more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.

B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain features to build a series of fortified areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.

1. This suggests that the Chinese intend to conduct a determined defense in these areas.

C. The Chinese also have [] aircraft in the northern military regions, about 40% of their total force. Most of the aircraft have an air defense role and are deployed in eastern China to protect important population and industrial centers.

25X1

D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets in the border area by more than three to one. Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial advantage in any operations other than a deep penetration of China because of their superiority in air power and in ground force weapons.

- 6 -

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June 10, 1975

CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

I. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its periphery by both missile and bomber.

A.

25X1

25X1

These missiles are of

two types:

1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we call the CSS-1. As you can see from this map, this system can reach targets in the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia

25X1

25X1

2. The 1,500 nautical mile--or intermediate range--missile we call the CSS-2.

25X1

this system

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could strike targets in most of the eastern
USSR, much of India, and Southeast Asia
as far south as Singapore.

25X1

25X1

3. The map also shows the coverage of China's
bomber force which I will
discuss a bit later.

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25X1

F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the Chinese have [] TU-16 medium bombers, which can carry a [] bomb to a radius of about 1,650 nautical miles.

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25X1

about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.

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25X1

3. The Chinese also have [] IL-28 jet
light bombers []

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[]

Chinese may plan to give a

25X1

nuclear role to some of these aircraft--which
have an operational radius of about 550
nautical miles.

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ILLEGIB

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March 1, 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have a total of ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

25X1

25X1

25X1

B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery of the USSR

25X1

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March 1, 1975

STRATEGIC FORCES

I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet strategic weapons programs.

25X1

A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems indicated. We believe that [redacted] ICBM launchers are currently operational. Since the signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have not increased the number of ICBM launchers.

MAP
ICBM
COMPLEXES

1. Of the deployed launchers, [redacted] are for the SS-9. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] The largest number of silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11 and SS-13 systems, [redacted]

25X1

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25X1

25X1

VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizeable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.

25X1

A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch silos

K1

1. There are currently [] launchers
for these missiles operational in the
western USSR, for use primarily against
targets in western Europe.

25X1

2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
[] MRBM and IRBM launchers located
along the periphery of the USSR. In late
1967, however, they began deactivating
some of the launch sites. []

25X1

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ILLEGIB

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1 March 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

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
25X1

1.



25X1

B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery



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March 1, 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have [REDACTED] ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

25X1

[REDACTED]

B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery of the USSR-- [REDACTED]

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1 March 1975

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

I. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.

A. The Soviets have a force of [] heavy bombers and [] tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary mission is intercontinental operations. They also have about [] medium bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.

25X1

25X1

1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight conditions. It is best suited for operations against targets in Europe and Asia.

25X1

25X1

25X1



4. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline. The Backfire costs substantially more than older medium bombers, and so the Soviets probably will not replace them on a one-for-one basis.

1 March 1975

THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.


A. The most visible military presence there is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.

MAP
OF
PORTS
IN
MEDITERRANEAN

1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets also have a continuing interest in improving their capabilities against ballistic missile firing submarines.

25X1


25X1



II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.

A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.

25X1



[REDACTED]

c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier--
expected to be fully operational in
late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean. This

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] -will probably
carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-
copters.

(1) These drawings show the size of
the Soviet carrier in relation to
US carriers.

CARRIER
SIZE
COMPARISON
CHART

25X1

25X1

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II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the

- 2 -

MAP
OF
SINO SOVIET
BORDER

Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

- A. There are about 38 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.
 - 1. The five divisions from the Siberian Military District that could be used as immediate reinforcements bring the total to about 43.
- B. For air support, they could call on some 1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area.
- C. The ground and tactical air forces in the border area now number about 400,000 men.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1 [REDACTED]

E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their strength to developing support units at the army and front level.

25X1

[REDACTED]

F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

1. As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.

III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the rapid build-up following the border clashes in 1969.

A. The force in these four northern military regions numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.

1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a clear military superiority and a commitment to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than

4,000 in the border regions against more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.

B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain features to build a series of fortified areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.

1. This suggests that the Chinese intend to conduct a determined defense in these areas.

C. The Chinese also have aircraft in the northern military regions, about 40% of their total force. Most of the aircraft have an air defense role and are deployed in eastern China to protect important population and industrial centers.

25X1

D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets in the border area by more than three to one. Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial advantage in any operations other than a deep penetration of China because of their superiority in air power and in ground force weapons.

March 1, 1975

CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

I. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its periphery by both missile and bomber.

A. We have identified [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] strategic

missiles. These missiles are of two types:

1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we call the CSS-1. As you can see from this map, this system can reach targets in the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia [REDACTED]

MAP:
RANGES OF
CHINESE
WEAPONS

25X1

25X1

2. The 1,500 nautical miles--or intermediate range--missile we call the CSS-2. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this system could strike targets

in most of the eastern USSR, much of India, and Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore.


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
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the Chinese have [redacted] TU-16 medium bombers, which can carry a [redacted] bomb to a radius of about 1,650 nautical miles.

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about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.

3. The Chinese also have [] IL-28 jet
light bombers. []

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[] the Chinese may plan to give a
nuclear role to some of these aircraft--which
have an operational radius of about 550
nautical miles.

October 8, 1974

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet strategic weapons programs.

A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems indicated. We believe that [redacted] ICBM launchers are currently operational. Since the signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have not increased the number of ICBM launchers.

1. Of the deployed launchers, [redacted] are for the SS-9. The SS-9, the largest operational Soviet ICBM, [redacted] [redacted] The largest number of silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11 and SS-13 systems, [redacted]

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VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizeable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.

A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a

range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are
deployed at soft-launch sites and in launch
silos [REDACTED]

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1. There are [REDACTED] launchers for these
missiles deployed in the western USSR, for
use primarily against targets in western
Europe.

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2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
[REDACTED] MRBM and IRBM launchers located
along the periphery of the USSR. In late
1967, however, they began deactivating some
of the launch sites. [REDACTED]

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
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
ABM Defenses

XI. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have  ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

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
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

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B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery of the



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c.




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Strategic Bombers

XII. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.

A. The Soviets have a force of [] heavy bombers and [] tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary mission is intercontinental operations. They also have [] medium bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.

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1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight conditions. It is best suited for operations against targets in Europe and Asia.

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4. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline. The Backfire costs substantially more than older medium bombers, and so probably will not replace them on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron

XIII. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.

A. The most visible military presence there is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.


1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets also have a continuing interest in improving their capabilities against ballistic missile firing submarines.
2. To accomplish these goals the Soviets maintain an average--including surface

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XIV. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.

A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.

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
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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier-- expected to be fully operational in

late 1976--will probably operate

primarily in the Mediterranean. This

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
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will probably carry

V/STOL aircraft and ASW helicopters.

(1) These drawings show the size of the
Soviet carrier in relation to US
carriers.

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XX. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

A. There are about 38 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.


1. The five divisions from the Siberian Military District that could be used as immediate reinforcements bring the total to about 43.

B. For air support, they could call on tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area.

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C. The ground and tactical air forces in the border area now number about 400,000 men.

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
could have almost one million men available for operations against China.

D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force

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E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their strength to developing support units at the army and front level.



F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

1. As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.

XIX. On the Chinese side, Peking has expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969.

A. In the four northern military regions, the force numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of the 3.5 million troops in China.

1. Most of the Chinese troops are defensively deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment is based on an overall military superiority and a commitment to the Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design.
 - a. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than 5,000 in the border regions compared with more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.
- B. The Chinese have established defensive areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders into China.
 1. Within these areas there are numerous fixed defensive positions which use favorable terrain features to protect

emplaced weapons and troops.

2. The Chinese evidently expect that these fixed positions will partially offset the significant Soviet advantage in weaponry.

C. The Chinese have [] tactical and air defense aircraft in the northern military regions. Most of these are deployed in Eastern China near important population and industrial centers.

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XXII. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its periphery by both missile and bomber.

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These strategic missiles are of two types:

1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we call the CSS-1. As you can see from this map, this system can reach targets in the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia

[]

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2. The 1,400 nautical mile--or intermediate

range--missile we call the CSS-2. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this system

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could strike targets in most of the
eastern USSR, much of India, and Southeast
Asia as far south as Singapore. [REDACTED]

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
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
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the Chinese have [redacted] TU-16 medium bombers, which can carry a [redacted] bomb to a radius of about 1,650 nautical miles.

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about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by the TU-16s and they

[REDACTED]

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3. The Chinese also have over 400 IL-28 jet
light bombers. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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the Chinese

may plan to give a nuclear role to some
of these aircraft--which have an operational
radius of about 550 nautical miles.

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SS-4 and SS-5

I. Information Sheet for the SS-4

A. Medium Range Ballistic Missile

1. Range - 1,000 nautical miles.



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6. Initially deployed in 1958.

B. Deployed in hardened silos and at soft launch sites in western USSR.



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II. Information Sheet for the SS-5

A. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

1. Range - 2,200 nautical miles.



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6. Initially deployed in 1961.

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7 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Draft for Your Consideration for a
mid-October Presentation [REDACTED]

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TITLE : The Philosophy of the US Strategic
Deterrent

Introduction

I am delighted to be here and to share with you some considerations on the philosophy of the US deterrent.

I am well aware that many contemporary thinkers would criticize such a subject by insisting that the US deterrent is more an object of faith than a topic for a proper philosophic discussion. I do agree that deterrence rests heavily on a belief in the credibility of the threat, but I think we can honestly address this concept philosophically--that is by investigating the facts and principles of reality and of human nature and conduct.

But I must be candid--such a philosophic pursuit is not an easy thing to do. What would be easy, would be for me to stand before you today and lecture for the next thirty minutes on broad, vapid generalities. For example, when I began to organize my remarks, my first temptation--which I quickly dropped--was to draw upon the approach of a thinker widely regarded as the Father of Western philosophy--Plato.

The "Absolutes" of Deterrence

In my mind's eye, I had invited him to the Pentagon to address our Joint Chiefs of Staff on the topic of deterrence as a philosophy. Adjusting his toga, Plato held before my awe struck colleagues the idea that deterrence was an absolute, that it had existence outside the mind. He then posed the postulates of deterrence:

- first, that in the intellectual world the threat of retaliation would deter a hostile act by another party;
- second, that the retaliatory threat, explicit or implicit, is of sufficient magnitude to

make the goal of the hostile act appear un-
attainable, or excessively costly, or both;
--third, that in order to work in the sensible
world, the retaliatory threat must be credible,
believable to the party being threatened; and
--lastly, that the sensual experience must be
augmented by visible, employable military
capabilities.

My hypothetical consultant, Plato, concluded
his remarks with his tried-and-true question and
answer technique. His principal question was:
what precisely does the US Government want its
military forces to deter? I cannot recall the turgid
discourse in detail, but the answers of my philosopher-
consultant went something like this:

--you expect your forces to forestall direct
attacks on the United States,
--at the same time, however, you accept the
equally heavy responsibility to deter nuclear
and conventional attacks on your allies, and
--you also view your forces as inhibiting co-
ercion by nuclear powers, and, in conjunction

with other US and allied forces, helping to inhibit coercion of your allies by such powers.

Mercifully, that ended the briefing. It also ended, in my plans, the idea of borrowing Plato's theory of the intelligible world and the sensible world. In part, I decided to fire Plato because, frankly speaking, a number of my colleagues and I have had some doubts that our thinking about deterrence and its requirements has really kept pace with the evolution of recent strategic threats.

Then I had a splendid idea. I would borrow the approach of one of the world's most renowned doubters. [REDACTED] The Seventeenth Century philosopher René Descartes. His approach, [REDACTED] was to start from doubt and attempt to come to something that he could not doubt. Descartes' criteria for clear and distinct ideas seems to me to be a better way to address our philosophy of deterrence and to highlight some of my own doubts about certain arcane calculations that have frequently supported our concept of deterrence. So I used his criteria to test several scenarios of modern hostilities.

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The Counterforce Concept

First, the scenario of a disarming, bolt-
from-the-blue first strike.

The clear and distinct fact on this frightening subject is that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has, or can hope to have, a capability to launch a disarming first strike against the other. This is because each possesses, and will possess for the foreseeable future, a devastating second-strike capability against the other.

--This almost certainly will deter the deliberate initiation of nuclear attack against cities, for it would bring inevitable retaliatory destruction on the initiator.

--For example, I can say without doubt that today, October ___, even after a more brilliantly executed and devastating attack than we believe our potential adversaries could deliver, the United States would retain the capability to kill more than 30 percent of the Soviet population and destroy more than

75 percent of Soviet industry. At the same time we could hold in reserve a major capability against the Peoples' Republic of China.

In short, and slightly modifying Descartes' criteria for truth, I can confidently tell you that our basic deterrent remains intact in regard to a counter-force bolt-from-the-blue.

The Damage-Limiting Concept

Now, what about another scenario--a damage-limiting preemptive strike?

This theory, which seemed to be particularly popular within the Soviet military establishment in the days before the 1972 SALT agreements, holds that the most efficient--or at least the least ineffective--way to employ your strategic forces would be to fire them when you had incontrovertable evidence of an irrevocable intention on the part of the enemy to attack you say, at, midnight tonight. Or, as our John Wayne would put it; beat the hired gun to the draw.

I can't speak for John Wayne, but one of the doubts Descartes and I would have here is: just what is hard evidence of an unchangeable plan that involves mutual suicide? The answer would appear to reside in the twisted subconscious, not the complicated conscious world. And since one must be at least conscious to be a doubter, we believe that any such doubts could rapidly be checked out by a number of means--the "hot line" for one.

--In this regard, I wish to say a few words which I hope you will not regard as overly optimistic. I believe that if both sides were to maintain continued communications in the hours preceding midnight tonight, and if both were able to describe precisely and meticulously the nature of the actions which had fostered such ominous uncertainties, then existential circumstances would place political leaders on both sides under powerful pressures to continue to be sensible.

Thus, on the concept of damage-limiting as on the idea of counterforce, our basic deterrent seems to remain a sound principle.

The Launch-On-Warning Concept

Another strategic consideration we may wish to stack up against our criteria test of deterrence is called launch-on-warning.

This is the scenario in which one side detects a massive launch against his forces and, in rapid reaction, fires all available units at the perceived enemy before the enemy's forces hit his. For the US and the Soviet Union, we are talking in terms of about 15 minutes at the most.

It should not surprise any of you to hear me say that Descartes did not write anything about the subject of launch-on-warning. The speediest inter-continental weapon system his contemporaries had to worry about was seapower under sail. But one Soviet military writer, who works in their civilian think tank called the USA Institute, has cogently addressed this subject. A few years ago he wrote that the time involved from the detection of a hostile launch to the order to release a nuclear counter-strike was so limited that the nuclear-release authority would have to pass from humans to computers.

For this Soviet writer, the technical systems needed for launching on detection "made real the worst catastrophies of science fiction."

I share such a conclusion, and from a philosophic viewpoint--particularly one involving sound political philosophy--relying on technical means to detect and then respond to a nuclear contingency is simply outside the realm of sensible political conduct.

The Concept of Assured Destruction

So, what can we say about the concept of retaliation--the one that I have in fact just used to test the scenarios of counterforce, damage limiting, and surrender to computers?

The general criteria we have used in thinking about and planning for retaliation is called assured destruction. The well worn notion of assured destruction has had many attractive features from the standpoint of sizing our strategic offensive approach. Our calculations have been strikingly simple:

--First, because nuclear weapons produce such awesome effects, they are ideally suited to assure the destruction of large, soft targets such as cities.

--Second, because cities contain such easily measurable contents as people and industry, it is possible to establish convenient quantitative criteria and levels of desired effectiveness with which to measure the potential performance of the strategic offensive forces.

--Finally, once these specific objectives are set, it becomes a relatively straightforward matter -- given an authoritative estimate about the nature and weight of the enemy's surprise attack -- to work back to the forces required for second-strike assured destruction.

The basic simplicity of these assured destruction calculations did not, however, mean that our force planners were at a loss for issues. On the contrary, important questions--questions that would boggle both Plato and Descartes (and possibly John Wayne)--continue to arise about the assumptions from which these calculations proceed. For a few typical examples:

--Where, for the sake of deterrence, should we set the level of destruction that we want to assure?

--It is enough to guarantee the ruin of several major cities and their contents, or should we -- to assure deterrence -- move much further and upward on the curve of destruction?

--Because our planning must necessarily focus on the forces we will have five or even ten years hence, what should we assume about the threat -- that is, the nature and weight of the enemy attack that our forces must be prepared to absorb?

--How pessimistic should we be about the performance of these forces in surviving the attack, penetrating enemy defenses (if they exist), and destroying their designated targets?

--How conservative should we be in buying insurance against possible failures in performance?

In general, we have answered these questions in a conservative fashion. But in the expensive process, the rather simple and attractive features of the assured destruction concept tended to strengthen what some of my colleagues call the canonical logic of the Triad.

First, a few words on the Triad. In order to ensure the necessary survival and retaliatory effectiveness of our strategic offense, we have maintained a triad of forces--nuclear armed bombers, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and inter-continental ballistic missiles.

--Each presents a different problem for an attacker.

--Each causes a specialized and costly problem for his defense.

--All give us high confidence that the force as a whole can achieve the desired deterrent objective.

While the triad's reassurances may bring solace to those who enjoy the simple calculations of assured destruction, in the judgment of many of my colleagues (and this is the reason I discharged Plato) our triad has in effect become a deus ex machina, and regarded by some as a substitute for thinking about new challenges to the concept of deterrence.

Let me go into this with a couple of flashbacks:

--Massive retaliation, as adopted by Secretary of State Dulles in the Fifties, involved the use of strategic weaponry in response to a whole array of possible actions. It involved striking back at any time and place we chose.

--Massive retaliation was a somewhat different doctrine from the assured destruction of the Sixties, for assured destruction tended to be described primarily in terms of going against cities.

But once the Soviet Union built up a counter-deterrent, assured destruction became a logically incredible kind of threat. It is not necessarily psychologically incredible, but it is logically incredible.

We proceed, from a logical point of view, that, first, the Soviet Union now has rough nuclear parity. We can wipe each other out after a first strike. In another way of looking at it, the bulk of our

strategic advantages are now generally offset by theirs. We have advantages in

- MIRVs and reentry vehicle technology,
- strategic bombers,
- guidance technology, and
- nuclear weapons technology.

The Soviets have advantages in

- numbers of launchers,
- throw weight, and
- ongoing missile development programs.

Secondly, with this recently achieved parity, Moscow might believe that Washington would be self-deterred from making use of its strategic forces. Thus (to complete the logic of this argument), the Soviets might regard themselves as relatively risk-free if our deterrent doctrine, our targeting doctrine, were to stress only going against cities.

It is precisely this problem of credibility that highlights new doubts, not just for my particular Cartesian philosophical approach, but for the concrete issues my policymakers must face. These

issues involve the actual decisions about the design and possible use of the strategic nuclear force.

--Not only must those in power consider the morality of threatening such terrible retribution on others for some ill-defined transgression by their leaders,

--they must also question the prudence and plausibility of such a response when the Soviet Union is able, even after some sort of first strike, to maintain the capability of destroying our cities.

The wisdom and credibility of relying simply on the preplanned strikes of assured destruction are even more in doubt when allies--rather than the United States itself--face the threat of a nuclear war.

The Issue of Retargeting

What I have just been talking about takes us, of course, to the widely discussed subject of US strategic retargeting.

First, a bit of background on the retargeting issue:

--In the past we have had massive preplanned strikes in which one would be dumping literally thousands of weapons on the Soviet Union.

Some of those strikes could to some extent be withheld from going directly against cities, but that was limited even then.

--With massive strikes of that sort, it would be impossible to ascertain whether the purpose of a strategic strike was limited or not. It was virtually indistinguishable from an attack on cities. One would not have had blast damage in the cities, but one would have considerable fallout and the rest of the horrors of nuclear effects.

--So what the change in targeting does is to give the President of the United States the option of limiting strikes down to a few weapons. It is to be understood that, if the United States were to strike the Soviet Union in response to some hypothetical act on their part, this would not have to be a massive response. The credibility of a massive response

was understandable in the Fifties and even in the Sixties when the United States had virtually a nuclear monopoly with regard to intercontinental strike forces. But the massiveness of those strikes has reduced the credibility of the deterrent since the Soviets began to introduce large numbers of missiles into their force structure.

--They now have a deterrent posture that is beyond the capacity of the United States to take away. Some welcome that, some do not welcome that. But I think it is a fact of life, and as I mentioned in my introductory remarks, facts of reality make a fit subject for a philosophic discussion of deterrence. To repeat, there is simply no way that the United States can limit damage to itself against a well coordinated strike by the Soviet Union.

Thus, the purpose of our change in targeting doctrine--a new doctrine which emphasizes flexibility and selectivity--is to shore up deterrence.

--The change in targeting doctrine serves to reduce doubts about deterrence across the

entire spectrum of risk. Consequently, it reduces the likelihood, which is fortunately already very low, of any outbreak of nuclear war.

--We want to keep recourse to nuclear weapons as far away as possible and our objective in all these matters is, if conflict were to come, to keep that conflict at as low a level of violence as possible. We are using the strategic forces, as it were, to establish a framework within which conflict, if it comes, would be fought at a low level, in terms of the destructiveness of the weapons involved.

I am well aware of some European disbelief that our strategic forces are locked into the security of Europe, despite our having made that pledge repeatedly over a period of many years. The decline in the credibility of our pledge was based on the belief that the Americans would not use their strategic forces if, for example, New York and Chicago were placed at risk in order to protect Western Europe. While some Europeans may still doubt

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our pledge, let me say that the reaction in Europe to our change in targeting doctrine has been welcoming, because it is recognized that this change means US strategic forces are still credibly part of the overall deterrent for Europe. That deterrent is based upon three components:

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- strategic forces,
- tactical nuclear forces, and
- a satisfactory conventional capability.

The Issue of Conventional War

In this regard, let me make a few brief remarks on the contribution of general purpose forces to deterrence. To do this, I will have to drop Descartes and lean on Hegel's dialectic.

The allocation of such a large proportion of our defense budget to general purpose forces may seem perverse in what has come to be known as the nuclear age. But there are a number of sound reasons for it.

- With the rise of Soviet nuclear power, which, as I mentioned a moment ago, has brought about an approximate parity in US-Soviet nuclear capabilities, the relative contribution

to deterrence.made by our own strategic forces has inevitably declined, even though these forces continue to have a unique and indispensable role.

--In an era of world-wide US interests, power politics and nuclear parity, it is preferably^e to deter or to repel limited threats by limited means. To do that requires a capability to place boundaries on conflicts and exercise some degree of control over the escalation of violence in the event that deterrence should fail. The general purpose forces, it is agreed in Washington, are best suited to do this.

Of the resources we invest in the general purpose forces, almost all go to conventional rather than to our tactical nuclear capabilities.

--In part, this is so because many of our delivery systems--artillery, short-range missiles, and tactical aircraft--are dual-capable, and therefore the distinction between their nuclear and their conventional role is not clear cut.

--But in greater part, it is because our forces, in their conventional role, can be used more flexibly and contribute more to our defense posture.

While it is essential to theorize about the nature of tactical nuclear warfare, we must acknowledge that as a practical matter, the initiation of a nuclear engagement would involve many uncertainties. Acceptable boundaries on such a conflict would be extremely difficult to establish. A nuclear engagement in the theater could well produce much higher military and civilian casualties and more widespread collateral damage than its non-nuclear counterpart, depending, of course, on the character and length of the engagement. What is more, it is not clear under what conditions the United States and its allies would possess a comparative military advantage in a tactical nuclear exchange.

Why, then, do we maintain such large and diversified nuclear capabilities in our main theater commands? As Saint Thomas Aquinas would respond, the answer is threefold:

--First, maintaining these capabilities is essential to deterrence so long as opposing

forces maintain similar capabilities. They help to deter a limited first-use of nuclear weapons by an opponent and along with the conventional and nuclear forces help create a general deterrent against either conventional or nuclear aggression.

--Second, should deterrence fail, the tactical nuclear capabilities provide a source of nuclear options for defense other than the use of the strategic forces.

--Third, given our doctrine of flexible response, we do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons by the United States and its allies in order to prevent a successful aggression.

Conclusion

Gentlemen, I have used (perhaps abused) several Western philosophers and one cowboy movie star to help convey some philosophic considerations on US deterrence. I would like to conclude my remarks with what we in America call common horse sense:

--As long as the US and the Soviet Union continue to behave intelligently and perceptively, the

likelihood that they would unleash strategic forces is so low that it approaches zero.

--We are determined, nonetheless, to have credible responses at hand for any nuclear contingency that might arise and to maintain the clear ability to prevent any potential enemy from achieving objectives against us or our allies that he might consider meaningful.

--Our plans for deterring such action do not invite war, they discourage it.

Thank you.

29 July 1974

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet strategic weapons programs.

A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems indicated. We believe that [redacted] ICBM launchers are currently operational. Since the signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have not increased the number of ICBM launchers.

1. Of the deployed launchers, about [redacted] are for the SS-9. The SS-9, the largest operational Soviet ICBM, [redacted]
[redacted] The largest number of silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11 and SS-13 systems, [redacted]

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C. [REDACTED] the Soviets--
under SALT--can replace these older launch-
ers with submarine launched ballistic missiles.

VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizeable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early-to mid-1960s.

A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a

range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch silos [REDACTED]

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1. There are [REDACTED] launchers for these missiles deployed in the western USSR, for use primarily against targets in western Europe.

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2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of

[REDACTED] MRBM and IRBM launchers located along the periphery of the USSR.

In late 1967, however, they began deactivating some of the launch sites. [REDACTED]

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ABM Defenses

XI. In recent years, there have been fewer developments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive missiles or submarines.

A. The Russians still have [redacted] ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.


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Strategic Bombers

XII. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.

A. The Soviets have a force of [] heavy bombers and [] tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary mission is intercontinental operations. They also have [] medium bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.

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
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1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight conditions. It is

best suited for operations against
targets in Europe and Asia.



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4. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline. The Backfire costs substantially more than older medium bombers, and so probably will not replace them on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron


XIII. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. As you are aware the Soviets maintain an extensive military presence in the Mediterranean area.

- A. The most visible military presence there is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group

deleted

home waters.


1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets



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XIV. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.

A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.



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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier--
expected to be fully operational in


late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean.



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i. These drawings show the size of
the Soviet carrier in relation
to US carriers.

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XX. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

A. There are about 38 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.

1. The five divisions from the Siberian Military District that could be used as immediate reinforcements bring the total to about 43.

B. For air support, they could call on []
[] tactical combat aircraft stationed in
the border area.

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C. The ground and tactical air forces in the
border area now number about 400,000 men.

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


D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border
reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians
have concentrated on improving and fleshing out
the basic force, []

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E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added

new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their strength to developing support units at the army and front level.



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F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

1. As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.

XXI. On the Chinese side, Peking has expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969.

- A. In the four northern military regions, the force numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of the 3.5 million troops in China.
1. Most of the Chinese troops are defensively deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment is based on an overall military superiority and a commitment to the Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.
 2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design.
 - a. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than 5,000 in the border regions compared with more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.
- B. The Chinese have established defensive areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders into China.

1. Within these areas there are numerous fixed defensive positions which use favorable terrain features to protect emplaced weapons and troops.
 2. The Chinese evidently expect that these fixed positions will partially offset the significant Soviet advantage in weaponry.
- C. The Chinese have [] tactical and air defense aircraft in the northern military regions. Most of these are deployed in Eastern China near important population and industrial centers.

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XXII. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its periphery by both missile and bomber.

[]

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These strategic missiles are of two types:

1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we call the CSS-1. As you can see from this map, this system can reach targets in the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia []

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[REDACTED]

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2. The 1,400 nautical mile--or intermediate range--missile we call the CSS-2. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this system could strike targets in most of the eastern USSR, much of India, and Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore. [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED]

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
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


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
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E. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the Chinese have [redacted] TU-16 medium bombers, which can carry a [redacted] bomb to a radius of about 1,650 nautical miles.

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about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by the TU-16s and they could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.

3. The Chinese also have [redacted] IL-28 jet
light bombers. [redacted]
[redacted] the Chinese
may plan to give a nuclear role to some
of these aircraft--which have an operational
radius of about 550 nautical miles.

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
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